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1 Introduction
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing
a sequence ofprivate signals. The signals are independent and identically dis-
tributed across time but not necessarily agents. Does it follow that the agents will
commonlylearn its value, i.e., that the true value of the parameter will become
(approximate) common-knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative when
each agent’s signal space is finite and show by example that common learning can
fail when observations come from a countably infinite signal space.
This is an important question for a number of reasons. Common learning is
precisely the condition that ensures efficient outcomes in dynamic coordination
problems in which agents learn the appropriate course of action privately over
time. For example, suppose the two agents have the possibility of profitably co-
ordinating on an action, but that the action depends on an unknown parameter. In
every periodt = 0,1, . . . , each agent receives a signal. The agent can then choose
actionA, actionB, or to wait (W) until the next period. Simultaneous choices ofA
when the parameter isθA or B when it isθB bring payoffs of 1 each. Lone choices
of A or B or joint choices that do not match the parameter bring a payoff of−c< 0
and cause the investment opportunity to disappear. Waiting is costless.Figure 1
summarizes these payoffs.
Under what circumstances do there exist nontrivial equilibria of this invest-
ment game, i.e., equilibria in which the agents do not always wait? Choosing
actionA is optimal for an agent in some periodt only if the agent attaches proba-
bility at least cc+1 ≡ q to the joint event that the parameter isθA and the other agent
choosesA. Now consider the set of historiesA at which both agents chooseA. At
any such history, each agent` must assign probability at leastq to A , that isA
must beq-evident(Monderer and Samet, 1989). Furthermore, at any history inA ,
each agent̀ must assign probability at leastq to the parameterθA. But this pair
of conditions is equivalent to the statement thatθA is common q-belief—the exis-
tence of histories at which there is commonq-belief inθA is a necessary condition
for eventual coordination in this game. Conversely, the possibility of common
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A B W
A 1,1 −c,−c −c,0
B −c,−c −c,−c −c,0
W 0,−c 0,−c 0,0
ParameterθA
A B W
A −c,−c −c,−c −c,0
B −c,−c 1,1 −c,0
W 0,−c 0,−c 0,0
ParameterθB
Figure 1: Payoffs from a potential joint opportunity, with actionsA, B, or wait
(W) available to each agent in each period.
q-belief is sufficient for a nontrivial equilibrium, as it is an equilibrium for each
agent̀ to chooseA on theq-evident event on whichθA is commonq-belief.
Now suppose that various forms of this opportunity arise, characterized by
different values of the miscoordination penaltyc. What does it take to ensure that
all of these opportunities can be exploited? It suffices that the information process
be such that the parameter eventually becomes arbitrarily close to common 1-
belief.
Beyond coordination problems, common learning is a potentially important
tool in the analysis of dynamic games with incomplete information. In the equilib-
ria of these games, players typically learn over time about some unknown parame-
ter. Examples include reputation models such asCripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(forthcoming), where one player learns the “type” of the other, and experimenta-
tion models such asWiseman(2005), where players are learning about their joint
payoffs in an attempt to coordinate on some (enforceable) target outcome. Char-
acterizing equilibrium in these games requires analyzing not only each player’s
beliefs about payoffs, but also her beliefs about the beliefs of others and how these
higher-order beliefs evolve. Existing studies of these models have imposed strong
assumptions on the information structure in order to keep the analysis tractable.
We view our research as potentially leading to some general tools for studying
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common learning in dynamic games.
In general, the relationship between individual and common learning is subtle.
However, there are two special cases in which individual learning immediately
implies common learning. When the signals are public then beliefs are trivially
common-knowledge. At the opposite extreme, common learning occurs when the
agents’ signal processes are stochastically independent and so (conditional on the
parameter) each learns nothing about the other’s beliefs (Proposition 2).
Apart from these extreme cases, when the signals are private and not indepen-
dent, the following difficulty must be addressed. If the signals are correlated, and
if the realized signal frequencies for agent 1 (say) are sufficiently close to the pop-
ulation frequencies under the parameterθ , then 1 will be confident thatθ is the
value of the parameter. Moreover, he will be reasonably confident that 2 will have
observed a frequency that leads to a similar degree of confidence inθ . However,
if 1’s frequency is “just” close enough to lead to some fixed degree of confidence,
then 1 may not be confident that 2’s realized frequency leads to a similar degree
of confidence: while 2’s frequency may be close to 1’s frequency, it may be on the
“wrong side” of the boundary for the required degree of confidence.
If the set of signals is finite, the distribution of one agent’s signals, conditional
on the other agent’s signal, has a Markov chain interpretation. This allows us
to appeal to a contraction mapping principle in our proof of common learning,
ensuring that if agent 1’s signals are on the “right side” of a confidence boundary
then so must be 1’s beliefs about 2’s signals. In contrast, with a countably infinite
signal space, the corresponding Markov chain interpretation lacks the relevant
contraction mapping structure and common learning may fail.
While we have described the model as one in which the agents begin with
a common prior over the set of parameters, we explain inRemark 3how our
analysis sheds light on agents who initially disagree butconvergeon a common
belief through a process of learning. Indeed, we can allow agents to begin the
process with arbitrary higher-order beliefs over the parameter space. As long
as each agent attaches some minimum probability to each parameter, and this is
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common knowledge, the agents will commonly learn the parameter and hence
approach a common posterior over the distribution of signals.
2 A Model of Multi-Agent Learning
2.1 Individual Learning
Time is discrete and periods are denoted byt = 0,1,2, .... Before period zero,
nature selects a parameterθ from the finite setΘ according to the prior distribution
p.
For notational simplicity, we restrict attention to 2 agents, denoted` = 1 (he)
and 2 (she). Our positive results (Propositions2 and3) hold for arbitrary finite
number of agents (see Remarks2 and4).
Conditional onθ , a stochastic processζ θ ≡{ζ θt }∞t=0 generates a signal profile
zt ≡ (z1t ,z2t) ∈ Z1× Z2 ≡ Z for each periodt, whereZ` is the set of possible
period-t signals for agent̀ = 1,2. For eachθ ∈ Θ, the signal process{ζ θt }∞t=0
is independent and identically distributed acrosst. We letζ θ` ≡ {ζ`t}
∞
t=0 denote
the stochastic process generating agent`’s signals. When convenient, we let{θ}
denote the event{θ}×Z∞ that the parameter value isθ , and we often writeθ
rather than{θ} when the latter appears as an argument of a function.
A state consists of a parameter and a sequence of signal profiles, with the set
of states given byΩ ≡ Θ×Z∞. We useP to denote the measure onΩ induced by
the priorp and the signal processes(ζ θ )θ∈Θ, and useE[ · ] to denote expectations
with respect to this measure. LetPθ denote the measure conditional on a given
parameter andEθ [ · ] expectations with respect to this measure.
A period-t history for agent̀ is denoted byh`t ≡ (z̀ 0, z̀ 1, . . . , z̀ t−1). We let
H`t ≡ (Z`)t denote the space of period-t histories for agent̀ and let{H`t}∞t=0
denote the filtration induced onΩ by agent̀ ’s histories. The random variables
{P(θ |H`t)}∞t=0, giving agent̀ ’s beliefs about the parameterθ at the start of each
period, are a bounded martingale with respect to the measureP, for eachθ , and so
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the agents’ beliefs converge almost surely (Billingsley, 1979, Theorem 35.4). For
any stateω, h`t(ω) ∈H`t is the agent̀ period-t history induced byω. As usual,
P(θ |H`t)(ω) is often writtenP(θ | h`t(ω)) or P(θ | h`t) whenω is understood.
For any eventF ⊂ Ω, theH`t-measurable random variableE[1F |H`t ] is the
probability agent̀ attaches toF given her information at timet. We define
Bq`t(F)≡ {ω ∈Ω : E[1F |H`t ](ω)≥ q}.
Thus,Bq`t(F) is the set of states where at timet agent̀ attaches at least probability
q to eventF .
Definition 1 (Individual Learning) Agent̀ learnsparameterθ if conditional on
parameterθ , agent̀ ’s posterior onθ converges in probability to1, i.e., if for each
q∈ (0,1) there is T such that for all t> T,
Pθ (Bq`t(θ)) > q. (1)
Agent` learnsΘ if ` learns eachθ ∈Θ.
Individual learning is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
Pθ (Bq`t(θ)) = 1, ∀q∈ (0,1). (2)
Remark 1 We have formulated individual learning using convergence in proba-
bility rather than almost sure convergence to facilitate the comparison with com-
mon learning. Convergence in probability is in general a weaker notion than al-
most sure convergence. However, sinceP(θ | H`t) converges almost surely to
some random variable, (2) is equivalent toP(θ |H`t)→ 1 Pθ -a.s.

We assume that each agent individually learns the parameter—there is no point
considering common learning if individual learning fails. Our aim is to identify
5
the additional conditions that must be imposed to ensure not just that each agent
learns the parameter, but that the agents commonly learn the parameter.
2.2 Common Learning
The event thatF ⊂ Ω is q-believedat timet, denoted byBqt (F), occurs if each












Hence, onCqt (F), the eventF is q-believed and this event is itselfq-believed and
so on. We are interested in common belief as a measure of approximate common-
knowledge because, as shown byMonderer and Samet(1989), it is common belief
that ensures continuity of behavior in incomplete-information games.
A related but distinct notion is that ofiterated q-belief. The event thatF is













1t(F)∩ . . .
Morris (1999, Lemma 14) shows that iterated belief is (possibly strictly) weaker
than common belief:
Lemma 1 (Morris) Cqt (F)⊂ I
q
t (F).
SeeMorris (1999, p. 388) for an example showing the inclusion can be strict.
The parameterθ is commonq-belief at timet on the eventCqt (θ). We say
that the agents commonly learn the parameterθ if, for any probabilityq, there
is a time such that, with high probability when the parameter isθ , it is common
6
q-belief at all subsequent times that the parameter isθ :
Definition 2 (Common Learning) The agentscommonly learnparameterθ ∈Θ
if for each q∈ (0,1) there exists a T such that for all t> T,
Pθ (Cqt (θ)) > q.
The agentscommonly learnΘ if they commonly learn eachθ ∈Θ.
Common learning is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
Pθ (Cqt (θ)) = 1, ∀q∈ (0,1).
BecauseCqt (θ) ⊂ B
q
`t(θ), common learning implies individual learning (recall
(2)).
An eventF is q-evidentat timet if it is q-believed when it is true, that is,
F ⊂ Bqt (F).
Our primary technical tool links commonq-belief andq-evidence.Monderer and
Samet(1989, Definition 1 and Proposition 3) show:
Proposition 1 (Monderer and Samet) F ′ is common q-belief atω ∈Ω and time
t if and only if there exists an event F⊂ Ω such that F is q-evident at time t and
ω ∈ F ⊂ Bqt (F ′).
Corollary 1 The agents commonly learnΘ if and only if for all θ ∈ Θ and q∈
(0,1), there exists a sequence of events Ft and a period T such that for all t> T,
(i) θ is q-believed on Ft at time t,
(ii) Pθ (Ft) > q, and
(iii) Ft is q-evident at time t.
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2.3 Special Cases: Perfect Correlation and Independence
We are primarily interested in private signals that are independently and identi-
cally distributed over time, but not identically or independently across agents. We
begin, however, with two special cases to introduce some basic ideas.
Suppose first the signals are public, as commonly assumed in the literature.
Then agent̀ knows everything there is to know aboutˆ̀’s beliefs, and we have
P(θ |H1t) = P(θ |H2t) for all θ andt—and hence beliefs are always common.
Individual learning then immediately implies common learning.
At the other extreme, we have independent signals. Here, the fact that agent`
learnsnothingabout agent̀̂’s signals ensures common learning.
Proposition 2 Suppose each agent learnsΘ and that for eachθ ∈Θ, the stochas-
tic processes{ζ θ1t}∞t=0 and{ζ θ2t}∞t=0 are independent. Then the agents commonly
learn Θ.
Proof. Our task is to show that under a given parameterθ and for anyq <
1, the event thatθ is commonq-belief occurs with at least probabilityq for all
sufficiently larget. We let Ft ≡ {θ} ∩B
√
q
t (θ) and verify thatFt satisfies the
sufficient conditions for common learning provided inCorollary 1





t (θ), parameterθ is q-believed onFt at timet.









q for all ` and all
t > T and hencePθ (Ft) > q.
(iii) To show thatFt is q-evident, we must show thatFt ⊂ Bq`t(Ft) for ` =






`t (θ) ∈ H`t , on Ft agent̀ attaches
probability 1 to the state being inB
√
q
`t (θ) and we have













































q for all ` and allt > T. The conditional independence
of agents’ signals implies that, givenθ , agent̀ ’s history is uninformative about






q.1 But, onFt , we haveP(θ |H`t) >
√









(θ) |H`t)P(θ |H`t) > q, (3)
and we have the desired result.
Remark 2 (Arbitrary finite number of agents) The proof ofProposition 2cov-
ers an arbitrary finite number of agents once we redefineFt as {θ} ∩B
n√q
t (θ),
wheren is the number of agents.

The role of independence in this argument is to ensure that agent`’s signals
provide` with no information about̀̂’s signals. Agent̀ thus not only learns the
parameter, but eventually thinks it quite likely thatˆ̀ has also learned the (same)
parameter (having no evidence to the contrary). In addition, we can place a lower
bound, uniform across agent`’s histories, on how confident agent` is that ˆ̀ shares
`’s confidence in the parameter (see (3)). This suffices to establish common learn-
ing.
One would expect common learning to be more likely the more information`
has about̀̂ , so that̀ has a good idea of̀̂’s beliefs. When signals are correlated,
`’s signals will indeed often provide useful information aboutˆ̀’s, accelerating
the rate at which̀ learns about̀̂ and reinforcing common learning. Clearly this
1Since conditional probabilities are only unique forP-almost all states, the setFt depends upon









(θ) | H`t). For other versions of condi-
tional probabilities, the definition ofFt must be adjusted to exclude appropriate zero probability
subsets.
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is the case for perfect correlation, but perhaps surprisingly, intermediate degrees
of correlation can generate information that may disrupt common learning. The
danger is that agent 1 may have observed signal frequencies “just” close enough
to lead to some fixed degree of confidence in the value of the parameter, but in the
process may have received evidence that 2’s frequencies are on the “wrong side”
of her corresponding boundary, even though quite close to it. We show this by
example inSection 4.
3 Sufficient Conditions for Common Learning
3.1 Common Learning
For our positive result, we assume that the signal sets are finite.
Assumption 1 (Finite Signal Sets)Agents1 and2 have finite signal sets, I and
J respectively.
We useI andJ to also denote the cardinality of setsI andJ, trusting the context
will prevent confusion.
We denote the probability distribution of the agents’ signals conditional onθ
by (πθ (i j ))i∈I , j∈J ∈∆(I×J). Hence,πθ (i j ) is the probability that(z1t ,z2t) = (i, j)
for parameterθ and everyt. For eachθ ∈Θ, let
Iθ ≡ {i ∈ I : ∑ j πθ (i j ) > 0}
and Jθ ≡ {l ∈ J : ∑i πθ (i j ) > 0}
be the sets of signals that appear with positive probability under parameterθ .
Denote
(
πθ (i j )
)
i∈Iθ , j∈Jθ by Π
θ .
We defineφ θ (i) ≡ ∑ j πθ (i j ) to denote the marginal probability of agent 1’s
signal i and ψθ ( j) = ∑i πθ (i j ) to denote the marginal probability of agent 2’s
signal j. We letφ θ = (φ θ (i))i∈Iθ andψ
θ = (ψθ ( j)) j∈Jθ be the row vectors of
expected frequencies of the agents’ signals under parameterθ . Notice that we
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restrict attention to those signals that appear with positive probability under pa-
rameterθ in defining the vectorsφ θ andψθ .
GivenAssumption 1, the following is equivalent to (1).
Assumption 2 (Individual Learning) For every pairθ andθ ′, the marginal dis-
tributions are distinct, i.e.φ θ 6= φ θ ′ andψθ 6= ψθ ′.
Our main result is:
Proposition 3 UnderAssumption 1andAssumption 2, the agents commonly learn
Θ.
Remark 3 (The role of the common prior and agreement onπθ ) Though we have
conserved on notation by presentingProposition 3in terms of a common prior, the
analysis applies with little change to a setting where the two agents have different
but commonly known priors. Indeed, the priors need not be commonly known—it
is enough that there be a commonly known bound on the minimum probability
any parameter receives in each agent’s prior. We can modifyLemma 3to still find
a neighborhood of signals frequencies in which every “type” of agenti will assign
high probability to the true parameter. The rest of the proof is unchanged.
Our model also captures settings in which the agents have different beliefs
about the conditional signal-generating distributions(πθ (i j ))i∈I , j∈J. In particular,
such differences of opinion can be represented as different beliefs about a param-
eter φ θ that determines the signal-generating process givenθ . The model can
then be reformulated as one in which agents are uncertain about the joint parame-
ter(θ ,φ θ ) (but know the signal-generating process conditional on this parameter)
and our analysis applied.
Our work is complementary toAcemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz(2006),
who consider environments in which even arbitrarily large samples of common
data may not reconcile disagreements in agents’ beliefs.Acemoglu, Chernozhukov,
and Yildiz(2006) stress the possibility that the agents in their model may not know
the signal-generating process(πθ (i j ))i∈I , j∈J, but we have just argued that this is
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not an essential distinction in our context. The key difference is that the signal-
generating processes considered byAcemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz(2006)
need not suffice for individual learning. In our context, it is unsurprising that
common learning need not hold when individual learning fails.

3.2 Outline of the Proof
Let ft(i j ) denote the number of periods in which agent 1 has received the signal
i and agent 2 received the signalj before periodt. Defining f2t( j) ≡ ∑i ft(i j )
and f1t(i)≡ ∑ j ft(i j ), the realized frequencies of the signals are given by the row
vectorsφ̂t ≡ ( f1t(i)/t)i∈I andψ̂t ≡ ( f2t( j)/t) j∈J. Finally, let φ̂ θt = ( f1t(i)/t)i∈Iθ
denote the realized frequencies of the signals that appear with positive probability
under parameterθ , with a similar convention for̂ψθ .
The main idea of the proof is to classify histories in terms of the realized





2t(θ)) with events exhibiting the appropriate frequencies.
Section3.4 develops the tools required for working with frequencies. The
analysis begins with an open neighborhood of frequencies within which each
agent will assign high probability to parameterθ . Indeed,Lemma 3shows that
there is aδ > 0 so that whenever 1’s observed frequency distributionφ̂t is within a
distanceδ of φ θ , his marginal signal distribution underθ , the posterior probability
he assigns toθ approaches one over time. LetF1t(0) denote thisδ -neighborhood




∥∥∥φ̂ θt −φ θ∥∥∥ < δ} .
By the weak law of large numbers, the probability underθ that the realized fre-
quency falls inF1t(0) converges to one (Lemma 4).
Next, we consider the set of frequencies that characterize the event that 1 as-
signs high probability toθ and to 2 assigning high probability toθ . This involves
three steps.
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STEP 1: Since the event we are interested in implies that 1 assigns high prob-
ability to θ , we can approximate 1’s beliefs about 2 by his beliefs conditional on
θ being the true parameter.
STEP 2: We now introduce an object that plays a central role in the proof, the
Iθ × Jθ matrix Mθ1 whosei j th element is
πθ (i j )
φ θ (i) , i.e. the conditional probability
under parameterθ of signal j given signali. At any datet, when agent 1 has
realized frequency distribution̂φt , his estimate (expectation) of the frequencies






The corresponding matrix for agent two, denotedMθ2 , is theJ
θ × Iθ matrix with
ji th elementπ
θ (i j )
ψθ ( j) .
We now make a key observation relatingφ θ , ψθ , Mθ1 , andM
θ
2 . Let D
θ
1 be the
Iθ × Iθ diagonal matrix withith diagonal element(φ θ (i))−1 and lete be a row
vector of 1’s. It is then immediate that
φ
θ Mθ1 = φ
θ Dθ1Π
θ = eΠθ = ψθ . (4)
A similar argument implies
ψ
θ Mθ2 = φ
θ . (5)




2 gives agent 1’s expectation of agent 2’s expec-
tation of the frequencies observed by agent 1 (conditional onθ ). Moreover,
Mθ12 ≡ Mθ1 Mθ2 is a Markov transition matrix on the setIθ of signals for agent
1.2 Section3.3collects some useful properties of this Markov process.
From (4), the continuity of the linear mapMθ1 implies that whenever 1’s fre-
quencies are in a neighborhood ofφ θ , we are assured that 1 expects that 2’s fre-
quencies are in the neighborhood ofψθ , and hence that 2 assigns high probability
to θ . Of course, “expecting” that 2 assigns high probability toθ is not the same as
2This perspective is inspired bySamet(1998).
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assigning high probability to it, and we must account for the error in 1’s estimate
of 2’s frequencies, leading to the third step.
STEP 3: We need to bound the probability of any large error in this estimate.
Lemma 5shows that conditional onθ , there is a timeT after which the probability
that 2’s realized frequencies are more than some givenε away from 1’s estimate
(φ̂ θt M
θ
1 ) is less thanε. A crucial detail here is that this bound applies uniformly
across all histories for 1. There is thus a neighborhood ofφ θ such that if 1’s fre-
quencyφ̂ θt falls in this neighborhood for sufficiently larget, then agent 1 assigns
high probability to the event that 2 assigns high probability toθ . LetF1t(1) denote
this neighborhood, which we can equivalently think of as a neighborhood ofψθ
into which φ̂ θt M
θ




∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 −ψθ∥∥∥ < δ − ε} ,
whereε is small and determined below.











2t(θ)), providing the first steps toward com-
mon learning. However, in order to showq-common belief, we need to show that
all orders of iterated (joint)q-belief can be obtained on neighborhoods ofφ θ and
ψθ , and common learning requires in addition these neighborhoods have high
probability. Rather than attempting a direct argument, we applyCorollary 1.
Suppose (for the sake of exposition) that every element ofMθ12 is strictly pos-
itive. In that case,Mθ12 is a contraction when viewed as a mapping on∆I
θ , a
property critical to our argument. Hence, for somer ∈ (0,1), if 1’s frequencies
are within δ of φ θ , then 1’s prediction of 2’s prediction of 1’s frequencies are
within rδ of φ θ . Consequently, iteratingBq1t andB
q
2t does not lead to “vanishing”
events.
Fix θ and a periodt large. A natural starting point would be to tryF1t ∩
F2t (whereF2t is defined similarly for agent 2 toF1t) as a candidate forFt in
Corollary 1. But since we also needFt to be likely underθ , we intersect these sets
with the event{θ} so thatFt ≡ F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ}.
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Observe that̂φ θt ∈ F1t(0) for all ω ∈ Ft by construction. It is also intuitive
(and indeed true) thatθ is q-believed onFt at time t and thatPθ (Ft) > q for
sufficiently larget. It remains to verify that the setFt is q-evident at timet, that is,




2t(Ft). It suffices to argue that
F1t ∩{θ} ⊂ Bq1t(F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ})
(the argument is symmetric for agent 2).
We first note thatF̀ t ∈H`t (i.e., agent̀ knows the eventF̀ t in periodt). Next,





∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥ < ε} is the event that 2’s realized frequencies
are close to 1’s estimate. Note that the eventF̂1t(1) may not be known by either
agent (i.e., we may havêF1t(1) 6∈H`t for ` = 1,2).
SinceMθ2 is a stochastic matrix, for allω ∈ F̂1t(1), we have
∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 Mθ2 − ψ̂θ Mθ2 ∥∥
< ε. We now setε small enough thatrδ < δ −2ε. SinceMθ12 is a contraction with
fixed pointφ θ (see (4) and (5)), we have, again from the triangle inequality,
F1t(0)∩ F̂1t(1)⊂ F2t(1).
Hence,F1t ∩ F̂1t(1)⊂ F2t , and so
F1t ∩ F̂1t(1)∩{θ} ⊂ F2t ∩{θ}.
But, fromLemma 5(recall step 3) we know that{θ}⊂Bq1t(F̂1t(1)∩{θ}) for large
t. Consequently,
F1t ∩{θ} ⊂ Bq1t(F1t ∩ F̂1t(1)∩{θ})⊂ B
q
1t(F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ}),
and we are done.
15
The proof ofProposition 3must account for the possibility that some elements
of Mθ12 may not be strictly positive. However, as we show inLemma 2, sinceM
θ
12
is irreducible when restricted to a recurrence class, some power of this restricted
matrix is a contraction. The proof proceeds as outlined above, with the definition
of F̀ t now taking into account the need to take powers ofMθ12.
Remark 4 (Arbitrary finite number of agents) The restriction to two agents sim-
plifies the notation, but the result holds for any finite number of agents. We illus-
trate the argument for three agents (and keep the notation as similar to the two
agent case as possible). Denote agent 3’s finite set of signals byK. The joint
probability of the signal profilei jk ∈ I ×J×K underθ is πθ (i jk). In addition to
the marginal distributionsφ θ andψθ for 1 and 2, the marginal distribution for 3
is ϕθ . As before,Mθ1 is the I
θ × Jθ matrix with i j th element∑k πθ (i jk)/φ θ (i)
(and similarly forM2). For the pair 1−3, we denote byNθ1 the Iθ ×Kθ matrix
with ikth element∑ j πθ (i jk)/φ θ (i) (and similarly forNθ3 ). Finally, for the pair
2−3, we have analogous definitions for the matricesQθ2 andQθ3 . As before,φ θ is
a stationary distribution ofMθ1 M
θ




3 ; similar statements hold






3 , as well as forϕ








Suppose (as in the outline and again for exposition only) that every element
of the various Markov transition matrices is non-zero, and letr < 1 now be the
upper bound on the modulus of contraction of the various contractions. The argu-
ment of the outline still applies, once we redefineF1t(1)≡ {ω :
∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 −ψθ∥∥ <
δ − ε}∩{ω :
∥∥φ̂ θt Nθ1 −ϕθ∥∥ < δ − ε} andF̂1t(1) ≡ {ω : ∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θ∥∥ < ε}∩
{ω :
∥∥φ̂ θt Nθ1 − ϕ̂θ∥∥ < ε} (with similar definitions for the other two agents).

3.3 Preliminary Results: Expectations about Expectations
We summarize here some important properties of the Markov chains induced by




Remark 5 (Markov Chains) From (4) and (5), the vectorφ θ is a stationary dis-
tribution for Mθ12 and ψ







θ ]TDθ1 is obviously symmetric and has a
nonzero diagonal (whereDθ2 is the diagonal matrix whosejth diagonal element
is (ψθ ( j))−1 for j ∈ Jθ ). This first property implies that the Markov processMθ12
with initial distributionφ θ is reversible.3 Consequently, the process hasφ θ as a
stationary distribution when run backward as well as forward, and hence (since
φ θ (i) > 0 for all i ∈ Iθ ) has no transient states. The second property implies that
Mθ12 has a nonzero diagonal and hence is aperiodic.

Remark 6 (Recurrent Classes)Two signalsi and i′ belong to the samerecur-
rence classunder the transition matrixMθ12 if and only if the probability of a tran-
sition from i to i′ (in some finite number of steps) is positive.4 We let(Rθ1(k))
K
k=1
denote the collection of recurrence classes, and we order the elements ofIθ o
that the recurrence classes are grouped together and in the order of their indices.
This is a partition ofIθ because (from Remark5) there are no transient states.
Similarly, the matrixMθ21 ≡ Mθ2 Mθ1 is a Markov transition on the setJθ that we
can partition into recurrence classes(Rθ2(k))
K
k=1.










′) if there exist signalsi ∈Rθ1(k) and j ∈Rθ2(k′) with πθ (i j ) > 0. Thenξ is a
bijection (as already reflected in our notation). It is convenient therefore to group
the elements ofJθ by their recurrence classes in the same order as was done with
Iθ . We use the notationRθ (k) to refer to thekth recurrence class in eitherIθ or
Jθ when the context is clear. This choice of notation also reflects the equalities of
3As Mθ12D
θ




′) = φ θ (i′)Mθ12(i
′i)
(Brémaud, 1999, page 81).
4Since the Markov process has no transient states, if the probability of a (finite-step) transition
from i to i′ is positive, then the probability of a (finite-step) transition fromi′ to i is also positive.
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the probabilities ofRθ1(k) andR
θ





θ (i) = ∑
j∈Rθ2 (k)
ψ
θ ( j)≡ ψθ (Rθ2(k)). (6)
Since agent 1 observes a signal inRθ1(k) under parameterθ if and only if agent
2 observes a signal inRθ2(k), conditional onθ the realized frequencies of the
recurrence classes also agree.

Let γθk denote a probability distribution overIθ that takes positive values
only on thekth recurrence classRθ (k), and denote the set of such distributions by
∆Rθ (k).
Lemma 2 There exist r< 1and a natural number n such that for all k∈{1, . . . ,K}
and for all γθk, γ̃θk in ∆Rθ (k)5∥∥∥γθk(Mθ12)n− γ̃θk(Mθ12)n∥∥∥≤ r ∥∥∥γθk− γ̃θk∥∥∥ (7)
and similarly for(Mθ21)
n.
Proof. We have noted thatMθ12 is aperiodic. By definition, the restriction of
Mθ12 to any given recurrence class is irreducible and hence ergodic. Thus, because
signals are grouped by their recurrence classes, there exists a natural number
such that(Mθ12)
n has the block-diagonal form with each block containing only
strictly positive entries. The blocks consist of the non-zeron-step transition prob-
abilities between signals within a recurrence class. The product ofγθk with (Mθ12)
n
is just the product ofγθk restricted toRθ (k) with thekth block of(Mθ12)
n. Because
it has all non-zero entries, thekth block is a contraction mapping (Stokey and Lu-
cas, 1989, Lemma 11.3). In particular, there exists anr < 1 such that (7) holds.
5For anyx∈ RN, ‖x‖ ≡ ∑Nk=1 |xk| is the variation norm ofx.
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3.4 Preliminary Results: Frequencies are Enough
Let φ̂ θk denote the distribution overIθ obtained by conditioninĝφ on thekth
recurrence classRθ (k) (for those cases in whicĥφ θ (Rθ (k)) > 0), and letφ θk,
ψθk, andψ̂θkt be analogous.
Our first result shows that if agent 1’s signal frequencies are sufficiently close
to those expected underθ , the posterior probability he attaches to parameterθ
approaches one.
Lemma 3 There existδ ∈ (0,1), β ∈ (0,1), and a sequenceξ : N → [0,1] with
ξ (t)→ 1 such that
P(θ | h1t)≥ ξ (t)
for all θ ∈ Θ and h1t satisfying P(θ | h1t) > 0,




φ θ (Rθ (k)) < β
−1 for all k. An analogous result holds for agent2.
Proof. Fix a parameterθ andδ̃ < mini,θ{φ θ (i) : φ θ (i)> 0}. Then
∥∥φ̂ θkt −φ θk∥∥
< δ̃ for all k only if φ̂t puts strictly positive probability on every signali ∈ Iθ . For





P(θ ′ | h1t)
= log
φ θ (it−1)P(θ | h1t−1)
φ θ
′(it−1)P(θ ′ | h1t−1)
.




1t ≥ λ θθ
′
10 + tη ∀θ ′ 6= θ
for all θ ′ ∈Θ and historiesh1t for which
∥∥φ̂ θkt −φ θk∥∥ < δ̃ for all k and for which
λ θθ
′




p(θ ′) is the log-likelihood ratio at time zero,
that is, the ratio of prior probabilities.
Our choice ofδ̃ , implying that every signali ∈ Iθ has appeared in the history
h1t , ensures thatP(θ ′|h1t) > 0 (and henceλ θθ
′
1t is well defined) only ifI
θ ⊂ Iθ ′.
This in turn ensures that the following expressions are well defined (in particular,
having nonzero denominators). Because signals are distributed independently and
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identically across periods,λ θθ
′



































































∣∣∣∣(φ̂ θt (i)−φ θ (i)) log( φ θ (i)φ θ ′(i)
)∣∣∣∣
≤ t logb‖φ̂ θt −φ θ‖





: φ θ (i) > 0
}
. By Assumption2, b > 1. Thus,
λ
θθ ′







∥∥∥φ̂ θt −φ θ∥∥∥) .
We now argue thatδ ≤ δ̃ andβ can be chosen to ensureHθθ ′− logb
∥∥φ̂ θt −φ θ∥∥ >



















∣∣∣φ̂ θt (Rθ (k))φ̂ θkt (i)−φ θ (i)∣∣∣ = ∥∥∥φ̂ θt −φ θ∥∥∥
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is continuous and equals zero if and only ifφ̂ θt (R
θ (k)) = φ θ (Rθ (k)) and φ̂ θkt =
φ θk for all k.
We thus haveδ andβ such that forθ andh1t satisfying the hypotheses of the
lemma andθ ′ with P(θ ′ | h1t) > 0, it must be thatλ θθ
′
1t ≥ λ θθ
′







Noting that this inequality obviously holds forθ ′ with P(θ ′ | h1t) = 0, we can sum






giving the required result.
We next note that with high probability, observed frequencies match their ex-
pected values. Together with Lemma3, this implies that each agent learnsΘ.
Lemma 4 For all ε > 0 andθ , Pθ (
∥∥φ̂ θt −φ θ∥∥ < ε)→ 1 and Pθ (∥∥ψ̂θt −ψθ∥∥ <
ε)→ 1 as t→ ∞.
Proof. This follows from the Weak Law of Large Numbers (Billingsley, 1979,
p. 86).
We now show that each agent believes that, conditional on any parameterθ ,
his or her expectation of the frequencies of the signals observed by his or her
opponent is likely to be nearly correct. Recall thatφ̂ θt M
θ
1 is agent 1’s expectation




2 is agent 2’s expectation of 1’s frequencies
φ̂ θt .
Lemma 5 For any ε1 > 0, ε2 > 0, there exists T such that for all t> T and for
every ht with Pθ (ht) > 0,
Pθ




(∥∥∥ψ̂θt Mθ2 − φ̂ θt ∥∥∥ < ε1 | h2t) > 1− ε2. (9)
Proof. We focus on (8); the argument for (9) is identical. Definingψ̄θt ≡
φ̂ θt M
θ
1 , the left side of (8) is bounded below:
Pθ
(∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1 ∣∣∣ h1t)≥ 1− ∑
j∈Jθ
Pθ
(∣∣∣ψ̄θt ( j)− ψ̂θt ( j)∣∣∣≥ ε1Jθ ∣∣∣ h1t) .
(10)
Conditional onθ andh1t , agent 2’s signals are independently, butno iden-
tically, distributed across time. In periods, given signalis, agent 2’s signals are
distributed according to the conditional distribution(πθ (is j)/φ θ (is)) j . However,
we can bound the expression on the right side of (10) using a related process ob-
tained by averaging the conditional distributions. The average probability that











πθ (i j )
φ θ (i)
= ψ̄θt ( j),
agent 1’s expectation of the frequency that 2 observedj.
Consider nowt independent and identically distributed draws of a random
variable distributed onJθ according to the “average” distribution̄ψθt ∈ ∆(Jθ ); we
refer to this process as the average process. Denote the frequencies of signals
generated by the average process byηt ∈ ∆(Jθ ). The process generating the fre-
quenciesψ̂t attaches the same average probability to each signalj over periods
0, . . . , t−1 as does the average process, but does not have identical distributions
(as we noted earlier).
We use the average process to bound the terms in the sum in (10). By Hoeffd-
ing (1956, Theorem 4, p. 718), the original process is more concentrated about its
22
mean than is the average process, that is,6
P̃
(∣∣∣ψ̄θt ( j)−ηt( j)∣∣∣≥ ε1Jθ )≥ Pθ (∣∣∣ψ̄θt ( j)− ψ̂θt ( j)∣∣∣≥ ε1Jθ ∣∣∣ h1t) , j ∈ Jθ ,
whereP̃ is the measure associated with the average process. Applying this upper
bound to (10), we have
Pθ
(∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1 ∣∣∣ h1t)≥ 1− ∑
j∈Jθ
P̃
(∣∣∣ψ̄θt ( j)−ηt( j)∣∣∣≥ ε1Jθ ) . (11)
The event{|ψ̄θt ( j)−ηt( j)| > ε1/Jθ} is the event that the realized frequency of












Using this bound in (11), we have
Pθ
(∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1 ∣∣∣ h1t)≥ 1−2Jθ e−2tε21/(Jθ )2.
This inequality holds for any historyh1t . We can thus chooset large enough so
that the right-hand side is less thanε2 and the statement of the lemma follows.
3.5 Proof ofProposition 3
We fix an arbitrary parameterθ and define a sequence of eventsFt (suppressing
notation for the dependence ofFt on θ ), and show thatFt has the three requisite
properties fromCorollary 1for sufficiently larget.
6For example, 100 flips of a(p,1− p) coin generates a more dispersed distribution than 100p
flips of a(1,0) coin and 100(1− p) flips of a(0,1) coin.
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The eventFt . Let δ ∈ (0,1) andβ ∈ (0,1) be the constants identified inLemma 3.
Pick ε > 0 such thatrδ < δ −2nε wherer < 1 andn are identified inLemma 2.
For each datet, we define the eventFt as follows.
First, we ask that agent 1’s realized frequency of signals fromIθ and 2’s from








∥∥∥ψ̂θkt −ψθk∥∥∥ < δ} . (13)
Lemma 2ensures that
∥∥φ̂ θkt (Mθ12)n−φ θk(Mθ12)n∥∥ will then be smaller thanδ on
Fk1t(0). We define our event so that the same is true for all powers ofM
θ
12 between








∥∥∥φ̂ θkt (Mθ12)l −φ θk∥∥∥ < δ −2lε} . (15)








∥∥∥ψ̂θkt (Mθ21)l −ψθk∥∥∥ < δ −2lε} . (17)




































φ θ (Rθ (k))
< β−1, ∀k
}








≡ [θ ]∩G2t . (19)
The equality of the two descriptions ofGθt follows from Remark 6. Finally, we
define the eventFt ,
Ft ≡ F1t ∩F2t ∩Gθt .
In the analysis that follows, we simplify notation by using{‖· ‖ < ε} to denote
the event{ω : ‖· ‖< ε}.
θ is q-believed onFt . By definition Ft ⊂ F1t(0)∩F2t(0)∩Gθt . Lemma 3then
implies that for anyq < 1, we haveFt ⊂ B
q
t (θ) for all t sufficiently large.
Ft is likely under θ . If φ̂ t = φ θ andψ̂ t = ψθ , then the inequalities (12)–(19) ap-
pearing in the definitions of the setsF1t , F2t , andGθt are strictly satisfied (because
φ θkMθ1 = ψ
θk andψθkMθ2 = φ
θk for eachk). The (finite collection of) inequali-
ties (12)–(19) are continuous in̂φ t andψ̂ t and independent oft. Hence, (12)–(19)
are satisfied for anŷφ t andψ̂ t sufficiently close toφ θ andφ θ . We can therefore
chooseε† > 0 sufficiently small such that
{‖φ̂ t −φ θ‖< ε†, ‖ψ̂ t −ψθ‖< ε†}∩ [θ ] ⊂ Ft , ∀t.
By Lemma 4, thePθ -probability of the set on the left side approaches one ast
gets large, ensuring that for allq∈ (0,1), Pθ (Ft) > q for all large enought.
Ft is q-evident. We show that for anyq, Ft is q-evident whent is sufficiently
large. Recalling thatε andβ were fixed in definingFt , chooseε1≡ εβ min j∈Jθ ψθ ( j).
Note thatε1/ψ̂θ (Rθ (k)) < ε on the eventsF1t ∩Gθt andF2t ∩Gθt .
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[STEP 1] The first step is to show that if the realized frequencies of agent 1’s
signals are close to their population frequencies underθ and his expectations of
agent 2’s frequencies are not too far away from agent 2’s realized frequencies,
then (conditional onθ ) the realized frequencies of agent 2’s signals are also close
to their population frequencies underθ . In particular, we show
F1t ∩Gθt ∩
{∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1}⊂ F2t . (20)
First, fix k and note that for eachl = 1, . . . ,n,
Fk1t(2l)∩{
∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε}
⊂ Fk1t(2l)∩{
∥∥∥φ̂ θkt (Mθ12)l − ψ̂θkt (Mθ21)l−1Mθ2 ∥∥∥ < ε}
= {
∥∥∥φ̂ θkt (Mθ12)l −φ θk∥∥∥ < δ −2lε}∩{∥∥∥φ̂ θkt (Mθ12)l − ψ̂θkt (Mθ21)l−1Mθ2 ∥∥∥ < ε}
⊂ {
∥∥∥ψ̂θkt (Mθ21)l−1Mθ2 −φ θk∥∥∥ < δ − (2l −1)ε}
= Fk2t(2l −1). (21)
The first inclusion uses the fact that(Mθ21)
l−1Mθ2 is a stochastic matrix. The equal-
ities use the definitions ofFk1t(2l) andF
k
2t(2l −1). The last inclusion is a conse-
quence of the triangle inequality. Similarly, forl = 1, . . . ,n, we have
Fk1t(2l −1)∩{
∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε} ⊂ Fk2t(2(l −1)).








We next note that
Fk1t(0)∩{
∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε} ⊂ Fk1t(2n)∩{∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε}
⊂ Fk2t(2n−1), (23)
whereFk1t(0) ⊂ Fk1t(2n) is an implication ofφ θk(Mθ12)n = φ θk, Lemma 2, and
our choice ofε andn; while the second inclusion follows from (21) (for l = n).




{∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε}⊂ F2t . (24)




‖φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ‖ = ∑
k
‖φ̂ θt (Rθ (k))φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt (Rθ (k))ψ̂θkt ‖
> ‖φ̂ θt (Rθ (k))φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt (Rθ (k))ψ̂θkt ‖
= ψ̂θt (R
θ (k))‖φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ‖,
sinceφ̂ θt (R
θ (k)) = ψ̂θt (R
θ (k)) on [θ ] (recall Remark 6). Our choice ofε1 then
yields that, onF1t ∩Gθt ,∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1 ⇒ ε > ε1
ψ̂θt (Rθ (k))
> ‖φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ‖, ∀k.
Therefore
F1t ∩Gθt ∩
{∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1} ⊂ F1t ∩⋂
k
{∥∥∥φ̂ θkt Mθ1 − ψ̂θkt ∥∥∥ < ε} ,
and by (24) we have proved (20).





ε2 = 1− p in Lemma 5.
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Consider the eventF1t ∩Gθt . For t sufficiently large, given any history consis-
tent with a state inF1t∩Gθt , agent 1 attaches at least probabilityp to θ (F1t∩Gθt ⊂
Bp1t(θ)) (Lemma3). Conditional onθ we have, byLemma 5, that for larget, agent
1 attaches probability at leastp to
∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥ < ε1. Hence
F1t ∩Gθt ⊂ B
p2
1t
({∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1}∩ [θ ]) .
SinceF1t ∩G1t is measurable with respect toH1t andGθt = [θ ]∩G1t , we have





{∥∥∥φ̂ θt Mθ1 − ψ̂θt ∥∥∥ < ε1}) ,
and hence, from (20),








1t (Ft) . (25)
A similar argument for agent 2 givesF2t ∩Gθt ⊂ B
p2
2t (Ft) and thusFt ⊂ B
p2
t (Ft)⊂
Bqt (Ft) for sufficiently larget.
4 A Counterexample to Common Learning
This section presents an example in whichAssumption 1fails and common learn-
ing does not occur, although the agents do privately learn. There are two values
of the parameter,θ ′ andθ ′′, satisfying 0< θ ′ < θ ′′ < 1. Signals are nonnegative
integers. The distribution of signals is displayed inFigure 2.7 If we setθ ′ = 0
andθ ′′ = 1 , then we can view one period of this process as an instance of the
signals inRubinstein’s (1989) electronic mail game, where the signal corresponds
to the number of “messages” received.8 It is immediate that the agents faced with
7It would cost only additional notation to replace the single valueε in Figure2 with heteroge-
neous values, as long as the resulting analogue of (26) is a collection whose values are bounded
away form 0 and 1.
8Rubinstein(1989) is concerned with whether a single signal drawn from this distribution
allows agents to condition their action on the state, while we are concerned with whether an arbi-
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Probability Player-1 signal Player-2 signal
θ 0 0
ε(1−θ) 1 0
(1− ε)ε(1−θ) 1 1
(1− ε)2ε(1−θ) 2 1
(1− ε)3ε(1−θ) 2 2
(1− ε)4ε(1−θ) 3 2




Figure 2: The distribution of signals for the counterexample given parameterθ ∈
{θ ′,θ ′′}, whereε ∈ (0,1).
a sequence of independent draws from this distribution learnΘ. We now show
that common learning does not occur.
What goes wrong when trying to establish common learning in this context,
and how does this depend upon the infinite set of signals? Establishing common
q-belief in parameterθ requires showing that if agent 1 has observed signals just
on the boundary of inducing probabilityq that the parameter isθ , then agent 1
nonetheless believes 2 has seen signals inducing a similar belief (and believes that
2 believes 1 has seen such signals, and so on). In the case of finite signals, a
key step in this argument is the demonstration that (an appropriate power of) the
Markov transition matrixMθ12 is a contraction. In the current case, the correspond-
ing Markov process is not a contraction (though the marginal distribution is still
stationary). As a result, agent` can observe signals on the boundary of inducing
probability q of stateθ while believing that agent̀̂ has observed signals on the
“wrong side” of this boundary.
The first step in our argument is to show that, regardless of what agents have
trarily large number of signals suffices to commonly learn the parameter. Interestingly, repeated
observation of the original Rubinstein process (i.e.,θ ′ = 0 andθ ′′ = 1) leads to common learning.
In particular, consider the eventFt at datet that the state isθ ′ and no messages have ever been re-
ceived. This event isq(t)-evident whereq(t) approaches 1 ast approaches infinity, since 1 assigns
probability 1 and 2 assigns a probability approaching 1 toFt whenever it is true.
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observed,nth-order beliefs attach positive probability to agent 2 having observed
larger and larger (and rarer and rarer) signals, asn gets larger (cf. (27) and (29)
below). We then argue that agents attaching strictly positiventh-order belief to
agent 2 having observed such extraordinarily rare signals will also attach strictly
positiventh order-belief to another rare event—that agent 2 hasneverseen a zero
signal (cf. (31)). Since zero signals are more likely under parameterθ ′′, this
ensures a positiventh-order belief in agent 2’s being being confident the parameter











Note that regardless of the signal observed by agent 1, he always believes with
probability at leastq that 2 has seen the same signal, and regardless of the signal
observed by 2, she always believes with probability at leastq that 1 has seen a
higher signal.
We show that for allt sufficiently large there is (independently of the observed
history) a finite iteratedq-belief thatθ ′ is the true parameter. This implies thatθ ′′
can never be iteratedp-believed for anyp > 1−q, with Lemma 1then implying
that θ ′′ can never be commonp-belief. That is, we will show that fort large
enough,Bq2t(θ
′) = Ω and soBp2t(θ
′′) = ∅ for all p > 1−q.
Define for eachk, the event that agent` observes a signal of at leastk before
time t:
D`t(k)≡ {ω : z̀ s≥ k for somes≤ t}.
Note thatD`t(0) is equal toΩ (the event that anyt-length history occurs). For
















Now, for anyK and any list
(
k1,k2, . . . ,kK
)
, whereks≥ ks−1, define the event
that agent̀ observes distinct signals of at leastks before timet,
D`t
(
k1,k2, . . . ,kK
)
≡ {ω : ∃ distinctτs≤ t, s= 1, . . . ,K, s.t. z̀ τs ≥ k
s}.
Note that forK ≤ t, D`t(0,k2, . . . ,kK) = D`t(k2, . . . ,kK). Whenever agent 1 ob-
serves a signalk he knows that agent 2 has seen a signal at leastk−1. Hence,
D1t
(
k1,k2, . . . ,kK
)
⊂ Bq1t(D2t(k
1,k2−1,k3−1, . . . ,kK −1))
and by similar reasoning
D2t
(
k1,k2, . . . ,kK
)
⊂ Bq2t(D1t(k
1 +1,k2,k3, . . . ,kK)),
so that for alln, if 0 ≤ k1 ≤ k2−2n, then
D2t
(
















































D2t(1,1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
). (31)
Now chooset large enough so that after at-length history in which signal 0
was never observed, agent 2 assigns probability at leastq to θ ′, i.e.,9











′) and hence have shown that for
t large enough, regardless of the history, there cannot be iteratedp-b lief inθ ′′ for
any p > 1−q, i.e. I p(θ ′′) = ∅. Now byLemma 1, Cp(θ ′′) = ∅.
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